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INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEM

No one favors the execution of an innocent person.' That event represents the ultimate failure of the justice system, both in the view of those who
consider the risk of such a failure to be so intolerable as to constitute a reason
for abolishing capital punishment altogether2 and in the view of those who
3
consider it to be an acceptable cost of an otherwise desirable institution.

Yet the danger of wrongful execution is chillingly real. Whether one
* Assistant Professor of Law, Hofstra University. B.A., 1975, Yale; M.A., 1977, Victoria
University of Wellington (New Zealand); J.D., 1979, Yale. Professor Freedman has represented
numerous capital prisoners around the country seeking collateral relief from their convictions
and sentences. These include Ronald Monroe and Earl Washington, Jr., whose cases are discussed in this Article.
1. I discuss here the class of people who are innocent of the crime of which they have been
convicted (although they may be guilty of some lesser offense), not the much more problematic
class of people who are "innocent" of the death penalty. In light of the decision in Penry v.
Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct. 2934, 2944, 2952-53 (1989), to extend Teague v. Lane, 109 S. Ct. 1060
(1989) - which evinced a special concern for claims of innocence, see id. at 1075-77 - to
capital sentencing, the problem of defining this latter class will require sustained attention. See
generally Ledewitz, Habeas Corpus as a Safety Valre for Innocence, 18 N.Y.U. REv. L & Soc.
CHANrGE 415 (1990-91); Brief of the ABA as Amicus Curiae at 8, Sawyer v. Smith, 110 S. Ct.
2822 (1989) (No. 89-5809), at least until Teague is overruled - as it should be. See Legislative
Modification of FederalHabeas Corpus in Capital Cases, 44 REc. A.B. OF TiE CITY OF N.Y.
852-53 (1989) [hereinafter Legislative Modification]. My discussion also excludes cases involving the belated discovery of evidence relevant only to mitigation.
2. See, eg., C. BLACK, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: THE INEVITABILiTY OF CAPRICE AND
MISTAKE 44, 64 (2d ed. 1981); Tabak & Lane, The Execution of Injustice:A Cost and Lack-ofBenefit Analysis of the Death Penalty, 23 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 59, 114 (1989).
3. See, e.g., Markman & Cassell, Protectingthe Innocent:A Response to the Bedau-Radelet
Study, 41 STAN. L. REv. 121, 123 (1988); van den Haag, The UltimatePunishment:A Defense,
99 HARv. L. REV. 1662, 1665 (1986).
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gains insight from scholarly studies,4 current judicial proceedings,5 or by experiencing the intensity of community pressures to convict someone - anyone
-

of these atrocious crimes, 6 it is difficult to deny that there is a special dan-

ger of factual error in capital cases. That danger is exacerbated both by the
grisly consequence of such errors and by the general tendency of evidence of
innocence to emerge only at a relatively late stage in capital proceedings."
Yet the states' corrective mechanisms are simply inadequate. Motions to

reopen criminal convictions on the grounds of newly-discovered evidence
must overcome understandably heavy policies in favor of finality and must
4. See, e.g., Bedau & Radelet, MiscarriagesofJustice in Potentially CapitalCases, 40 STAN.
L. REv. 21 (1987).
5. See, e.g., Tabak & Lane, supra note 2, at 99-114 (listing cases in which Death Row
inmates have been released after proof of innocence); Judge Issues DirectedAcquittal to Former
DeathRow Inmate, United Press International, Florida Wire, March 14, 1990 (reporting case of
Robert Craig Cox); L.A. Times, July 16, 1989, at 1, col. 1 (describing case of Jerry Bigelow,
convicted and sentenced to death in California after confessing nine times, but acquitted on
retrial). Of course, reported cases often tell only a small part of the story. Compare, e.g., The
Confessions and the Tangle of Doubt, Wash. Post, Jan. 28, 1987, at DI, col. 1 (raising doubts
about guilt of Rolando Cruz) with People v. Cruz, 121 Ill. 2d 321, 521 N.E.2d 18, cert. denied,
488 U.S. 869 (1988) (reversing conviction on other grounds and holding that guilt presented
jury issue). Hence, it seems likely that the incidence of the innocence problem is significantly
understated, since relatively few inmates succeed in attracting press attention (a project which
requires, among other things, competent attorneys). Thus, for example, although there has
been no media coverage until very recently, there is substantial reason to doubt the guilt of Earl
Washington, Jr., currently incarcerated on Virginia's death row. The conviction of this mentally retarded black man for the rape and murder of a white woman rests exclusively on his
affirmation of statements made to him by law enforcement officials, and is at odds with the
physical evidence. See Brief for Appellant at 1-11, Washington v. Murray (4th Cir. 1989) (No.
89-4013); Wash. Post, July 2, 1990, at Al, col. 2.
6. See 1 J. Liebman, Federal Habeas Corpus Practice and Procedure § 2.2(d), at 22-24
(1988); Tainted Verdicts ResurrectSpecter ofExecuting the Innocent, N.Y. Times, May 3, 1989,
at A18, col. 1; cf. N.Y. Times, Apr. 26, 1990, at A17, col. 1 (broad public approval for death
penalty in Japan, where in last decade four people sentenced to death were later acquitted on
the basis of new evidence).
Such pressures lead law enforcement officers to cut constitutional corners. See, e.g., Bowen
v. Maynard, 799 F.2d 593 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 962 (1986) (state supresston of
exculpatory evidence); Texan Releasedfrom Death Row, N.Y. Times, Jan. 24, 1990, at A15, col.
I (describing case of Clarence Lee Brandley in which state destroyed exculpatory evidence and
witnesses lied); Death Row Inmate Freed on Bond Amid New Doubts in Murder Case, Wash.
Post, Aug. 31, 1986, at A3, col. 1 (describing Bowen case). Moreover, these pressures worsen
the performances of defense attorneys. For a lawyer, "[ft]aking on such a case means making a
commitment to the full legal and factual evaluation of two very different proceedings (guilt and
sentencing) in circumstances where the client is likely to be the subject of intense public hostility, where the state has devoted maximum resources to the prosecution, and where one must
endure the draining emotional effects of one's personal responsibility for the outcome." Legislative Modification, supra note 1, at 854.
7. In particular, because of the pressures already described, see supra note 6, it is often
only after the passage of time that witnesses - whether law enforcement officers, prosecutors
no longer in office, or prisoners released from custody - are willing to come forward. Moreover, the quality of legal representation, which is "generally lamentably low" at capital trials,
Tigar, Lawyers and Death Cases, 16 LITIGATION 1 (1990), tends to improve somewhat as a
prisoner moves through the system, since the insufficiency of legal resources results in a system
of triage that generally finds the most qualified lawyers concentrating their efforts on those
defendants closest to execution.
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meet burdens which require a finding, for example, that the profferred material "would probably have changed the verdict." 8 These standards, of course,
are applied by a judge (normally the original trial judge), not by a jury. This
practice deprives the defendant of a jury's sensitivity to possible weaknesses in
the prosecutor's case on the issue of guilt - a sensitivity that is recognized to
act as a safeguard against the return not only of a wrongful conviction but also
of a death sentence against the possibly innocent.9 Moreover, once a conviction becomes final, many states will not permit such claims in the context of a
state collateral proceeding' ° - notwithstanding the fact that this is commonly
the lengthiest element of the entire capital adjudicatory process, and hence a
stage at which new evidence may well emerge.
Compounding the problem, claims of factual innocence are not cognizable on federal habeas corpus." Seeking to discover a rationale for this prohibi8. FLA. R. CRim. P. 3.600(a)(3) (new trial to be granted if defendant shows discovery of
"new and material evidence, that if introduced at trial would probably have changed the verdict
or finding of the court, and that the defendant could not with reasonable diligence have discovered and produced [the evidence] upon the trial"); see also Dick v. State, 287 S.E.2d 11, 248 Ga.
898 (1982), in which the court held that, when a motion is made more than 30 days after trial,
movant must show:
(1) that the newly discovered evidence has come to his knowledge since the trial;
(2) that want of due diligence was not the reason that the evidence was not acquired
sooner, (3) that the evidence was so material that it would probably produce a different verdict; (4) that it is not cumulative only; (5) that the affidavit of the witness is
attached to the motion or its absence accounted for, and (6) that the new evidence
does not operate solely to impeach the credit of a witness.
Id. at 13-14, 248 Ga. at 900 (citations omitted).
9. See Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 181 (1986); see also Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S.
38, 49-51 (1980). Because the death penalty system in this country is "starkly sectional," I J.
Liebman, supra note 6, § 26.6, at 409 & n.4, judges in areas of the country where the courts see
numerous capital cases may well become calloused, causing them to react with greater skepticism to innocence claims than do jurors, who in all likelihood are sitting on their first capital
case.
10. Examples include Arkansas, in proceedings under ARu. L CR IM.P. 37.1; Florida, in
proceedings under FLA. R. CriM. P. 3.850; and Virginia, in proceedings under VA. CODE ANN.
§ 8.01-654 (1984). See Dumond v. State, 743 S.W.2d 779, 782, 294 Ark. 379, 385 (1988),federal habeasreliefgrantedsub nor. Dumond v. Lockhart, 885 F.2d 419 (8th Cir. 1989); Fitzgerald v. Bass, 366 S.E.2d 615, 619, 6 Va. App. 38, 45 (1988), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 354 (1989);
Hicks v. State, 400 So. 2d 955, 959 (Fla. 1981).
11. See Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 317 (1963) ("[T]he existence merely of newly
discovered evidence relevant to the guilt of a state prisoner is not a ground for relief on federal
habeas corpus"); Armstead v. Maggio, 720 F.2d 894, 896-97 (5th Cir. 1983) (federal habeas
relief unavailable despite affidavit of another confessing to crime and exculpating petitioner).
The issue is discussed with customary thoroughness and insight by Professor Liebman in 1 J.
LIEBMAN, supra note 6, § 2.2(c), at 12-21.
Notwithstanding this principle, the "Constitution prohibits the criminal conviction of any
person except upon proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson v. Virginia, 442 U.S.
307, 309 (1979) (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970)). A federal habeas corpus petitioner
is, therefore, entitled to "relief if it is found that upon the record evidence adduced at the trial
no rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 324.
However, because the habeas court applying this decision is confined to an examination of the
record of the original trial, id. at 322, the rule provides little help in the context of raising a
claim of innocence based on new evidence.
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tion among the cases, one is likely to find oneself soon lost among a wilderness
of antiquarian legalisms - for instance, that federal habeas corpus only exam12
ines the "jurisdiction" of the convicting court to detain the prisoner.
Clearly, such explanations fail to account for the modem role of federal
13
habeas corpus in the justice system.
CHOOSING A SOLUTION

One obvious solution to the innocence problem would be simply to provide, by judicial decision or statute, that claims of factual innocence may indeed be raised on federal habeas corpus. While this would certainly be a
direct solution (and one which would have the benefit of making these brief
remarks even briefer 14 ), it would ultimately raise more problems than it would
solve. The reason is federalism.
Over the last generation, federalism has had a bad reputation among social reformers. Championed by those resisting racial integration, and appropriated by conservative politicians, 15 it has lost much of the promise it once
held for social change 6 - notwithstanding the more recent efforts of some
17
liberals to point to its potential.
When discussing federalism, it is critical to distinguish between two
types. Horizontal federalism sees the possibility of social progress in the
states' capability to experiment with and compete in devising varying solutions
to social problems." Vertical federalism, regardless of differences between
states, seeks to protect the liberties of the citizen by delegating power downwards to the most local, and therefore most politically accountable, level.1 9
Those who seek to reform or to abolish the current death penalty system
generally disfavor horizontal federalism. The performance of the states in the
area of capital punishment has been such as to justify a concern that any cor12. See Ex Parte Craig, 282 F. 138, 148-49 (2d Cir. 1922); 1 J. LIEBMAN, supra note 6,
§ 2.2(b), at 11-12.
13. See Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 445-48 (1986) (plurality opinion),
14. See generally Church, A Pleafor Readable Law Review Articles, 1989 Wisc. L. REV.
739.
15. See, eg., Bush, Federalism: Restoring the Balance, 18 CUMBERLAND L. REv. 125

(1987).
16. See, eg., New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State
may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.").
17. See Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of IndividualRights, 90 HARV. L.
REV. 489, 503 (1977); Collins & Skover, The Future ofLiberal Legal Scholarship, 87 MIcH. L.
REv. 189, 217-19 (1989). See generally Utter, State Constitutional Law, the United States
Supreme Court, and DemocraticAccountability: Is There a Crocodile in the Bathtub?, 64 WASH.
L. REv. 19 (1989).
18. See supra note 16.
19. See THE FEDERALIST No. 46, at 316 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (noting a closer
connection between the people and their state government than between the people and the
federal government).
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petition among them will be a race to the bottom.' Even if the outlook for
positive political change were more optimistic,2 1 the idea of permitting the
states to experiment with a process that determines whether a person lives or
dies is, or should be, unacceptable.
Vertical federalism, however, is another matter. In embracing it, death
penalty reformers lose little by way of prospects for favorable federal action,"
while perhaps gaining support from significant conservative elements that
would otherwise oppose them. 23 More significantly, the dangers of central
20. See Tabak, The Death of Fairness"The Arbitrary and CapriciousImposition of the
Death Penalty in the 1980s, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 797 (1986).
21. The 1990 political races only reinforced the thesis that state politics will not soon lead
to death penalty reform. Competing gubernatorial aspirants in Florida, Texas, and California
engaged in vigorous efforts to persuade the electorate that voting for them was the surest way to
maximize the number of executions. See The PoliticalStampede on Execution, N.Y. Times,
April 4, 1990, at A16, col. 1; The PoliticsofDeath, The Economist, Mar. 24, 1990, at 25, col. 1;
see also Baker, At the End of the Polls, N.Y. Times, May 2, 1990, at A27, col. 6 ("Capital
punishment is the perfect cause for today's pol who lives by the polls.").
22. Without discussing in detail the current outlook for legislative action on the federal
level, see Berger, The Chiropractoras Brain Surgeon: Defense Lawyering in Capital Cases, 18
N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 245 (1990-91); Goldstein, ChippingAway at the Great Writ:
Will Death Sentenced FederalHabeas CorpusPetitionersBe Able to Seek and Utilize Changesin
the Law?, 18 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 357 (199-91); Mello & Duffy, Suspending
Justice: The Unconstitutionalityof the ProposedSix-Month Time Limit on the Filing ofHabeas
Corpus Petitionsby State Death Row Inmates, 18 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 451 (199091), it is clear that any solutions along federal lines will involve significant elements of compromise. Death penalty reformers are not likely to succeed in turning outright defeats in the states
into outright victories in Congress.
The trend in the federal courts is strongly towards restricting, not expanding, the scope of
the federal habeas corpus remedy. See Amsterdam, Forewordto 1 J. LIEBMAN, supra note 6, at
v-vi. A stark recent example is Butler v. McKellar, 110 S. Ct. 1212 (1990) (5-4 opinion), which
explicitly adopts the view that the citizens of a state (in this case, those citizens sentenced to
death), and not its government, must bear the risk that a course their state chooses to pursue
violates the Constitution. See id. at 1214 (if outcome of case "was susceptible to debate among
reasonable minds," decision was a "new rule" and hence ordinarily not to be applied retroactively). Cf Legislative Modification, supra note 1, at 853 (describing such risk-shifting as "simply perverse").
Nonetheless, whatever the prospect of its current acceptance by the courts, a strong legal
argument exists that the execution of a prisoner violates the eighth amendment's requirements
of a comprehensive, reliable, individualized sentencing determination where newly-acquired evidence, never considered by the sentencing jury, creates a reasonable doubt as to guilt. See
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the Criminal District Court for the Parish of Orleans, Louisiana, at 16-18, Monroe v. Butler (U.S. No. 88-1154) (January 11, 1989) (making this argument
on behalf of Ronald Monroe). Although Monroe's case built a Bleak House of state and federal
proceedings, its essence was simple: following Monroe's conviction, the state learned of the
plausible confession of another man to the crime but suppressed it. See Id. at App. D - E
(reprinting federal factual findings). Nevertheless, the federal courts rejected Monroe's claim
under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (defendant's right to fair trial violated when
prosecution suppresses evidence favorable to accused), and refused to overturn either the conviction or the sentence. See Monroe v. Blackburn, 748 F.2d 958, 960-62 (5th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 476 U.S. 1145 (1986); Monroe v. Butler, 690 F. Supp. 521 (E.D. La.), aff'd, 853 F.2d
924 (5th Cir.), habeascorpuspetition denied, 883 F.2d 331 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 487 U.S. 1247
(1988). After extensive press coverage, the Governor of Louisiana commuted Monroe's sentence. Tabak & Lane, supra note 2, at 106-07; see also infra note 35.
23. It is worth noting that conservatives are divided between libertarian and statist camps,
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government power in this area are disturbingly real. If factual innocence in
death penalty cases were cognizable on federal habeas corpus, the federal government would be responsible for the accuracy of capital convictions. The
record of government abuse of the execution power around the world2 4 hardly
suggests that - in the age of Willie Horton25 - we should experiment here
with centralizing it.2 6 In order to protect individual liberty, our system seeks
slower but surer government action rather than placing its highest value on
efficiency. 27 Thus, we must seek a more roundabout, but safer, solution.
One such approach is embodied in the following tentative proposals for
legislative change, one federal and one for the states. Either proposal could be
implemented alone to achieve some benefits. The adoption of both together
would create a smoothly integrated mechanism that would largely resolve the
innocence problem without the danger of doing more harm than good.
1.

ProposalOne

The federal habeas corpus statute2" should be amended to allow the prisoner in a capital case to make the claim that, because of new evidence bearing
on guilt, excusably discovered since trial, there is now probable cause to believe that a new jury might reach a different outcome on either guilt or
sentence.
This standard is deliberately phrased in the same probable cause terms
used in the federal and many state systems to bind over criminal defendants
just as liberals are split between libertarian and socialist camps. See Safire, The Big-Gov Right,
N.Y. Times, May 11, 1990, at A35, col. 6.
24. Every reader will find it easy to supply her own list of examples: China, Iraq, Liberia
in one year, Saudi Arabia and Iran in another, the Soviet Union and South Africa in yet another. See generally Freedman, Crime in a Society Governed by Laws, N.Y. Times, Dec. 14,
1979, at A30, col. 2 (letter to the editor).
25. See generally Savitz & Katz, Sound Bites Have Teeth, N.Y. Times, Mar. 26, 1990, at
A17, col. 1; Toward a Campaign of Substance in '92, N.Y. Times, Mar. 26, 1990, at C16, col. 4.
26. The Framers would certainly have agreed. They sought to protect the people from
possible abuses of power by the national government, a project based on the premise "that
officeholders were not to be trusted and that the corrupting effect of power would inevitably
cause them to seek their own aggrandizement at the expense of citizens' liberty." Freedman,
Freedom of Information and the FirstAmendment in a BureaucraticAge, 49 BROOKLYN L.
REv. 835, 836 (1983) (citing contemporary sources); see 3 J. ELLIOTT, THE DEBATES IN THE
SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 563 (2d
ed. 1836) (remarks of William Grayson to the Virginia ratifying convention, June 21, 1788:
"[Plower ought to have such checks and limitations as to prevent bad men from abusing it. It
ought to be granted on a supposition that men will be bad; for it may eventually be so.").
The recent resurrection of the federal death penalty, see 21 U.S.C.A. § 848(e) (1991 Sup.
plement), illustrates the greater danger posed by a federalization of capital punishment. Federal
death penalty defendants wishing to challenge their convictions by means of habeas corpus
petitions will receive only one layer of review - at the federal level - while state death penalty
defendants are able to mount collateral challenges first at the state and then at the federal level.
In addition, a federal death penalty statute extends capital punishment to states whose polities
have otherwise rejected it.
27. See J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 80 (1980).
28. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1988).
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for plenary trials. The idea is that a federal judge's use of this well-developed

body of law will encourage her to leave ultimate resolution of the matter to
state processes and to avoid reliance on her own predictions of the eventual

outcome of those processes. 29
If the federal habeas judge found that probable cause existed, 30 she would
certify this finding, issue a stay of execution, and remand the case to the convicting state to be dealt with in accordance with that state's existing procedures on motions for new trials.31
While a first reaction to this proposal might be that it provides prisoners
with extensive new opportunities for delay, sober second thought should suggest the contrary. Presently, claims of innocence are made on federal habeas
corpus but are asserted on other grounds. Examples include claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, Brady violations, and sentencing errors. 32 This results in more procedural complexity, and more delay, than would exist under
my proposal.
Moreover, nothing in this first proposal would prevent a state that now
places serious obstacles in the path of such motions 33 from continuing to do
so; a state court could summarily reject the claim even after federal certification. But there are good reasons to believe that state officials who failed to
take such matters seriously would face a significant public outcry. First, the
issuance of such a certificate by a federal court would likely be an event of
sufficient importance, particularly in the affected state, to generate the press
coverage that is often critical to bringing these injustices to public attention.'
Second, those who support the death penalty do not want to give its opponents
the ammunition that a wrongful execution would provide. Hence, advocates
of capital punishment are often among the most vocal of those demanding
corrective action when it appears that an error has been committed.35 The
possibility of a wrongful execution tends to generate strong political pressure
on -

and to provide political cover for - state authorities who would other-

wise be unwilling to act.
29. See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text (describing state processes).
30. The determination of probable cause would, of course, be one of law, and reviewable
accordingly by the Circuit Courts of Appeals.
31. A variation might be for the federal judge to remand only the innocence issue to state
court while federal litigation would proceed on the remaining issues. Or perhaps the determination to follow one course or the other could be left to the trial judge.
32. For discussions of these problems, see infra note 36 (innocence cast as ineffective assistance of counsel); supra note 22 (procedural complexity when innocence litigated in context of
Brady claim); Legislative Modification, supra note 1, at 864 n.44 (prisoners with claim of innocence likely to state it as attack on sentence).
33. See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text.
34. See supra note 5.
35. Thus, for example, Ronald Monroe, whose case is described supra note 22, was particularly benefitted by the support he received from those who generally favor the death penalty.
See, e.g., Buckley, But Did They Get the Right Man?, Wash. Post, Aug. 16, 1989, at A21, col. 1;
One Last Chance to Save a Life, N.Y. Daily News, Aug. 3, 1989, at 48, col. 1.
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2. Proposal Two
Under the second proposal, each death penalty state would adopt a uniform standard for dealing with innocence claims in capital cases, whether
those claims arise on motions for new trials (which should be limited to the
period prior to affirmance on direct appeal), on state habeas corpus (where the
attack should be cognizable), or pursuant to federal certification.3 6 In any
event, once a judge determines that the failure to raise the claim earlier was
not due to deliberate witholding by the defendant, 37 the defendant should be
entitled to a jury determination on the probable cause issue.
Specifically, a panel acting like a grand jury should decide whether there
is probable cause to believe that a new jury might reach a different outcome on
either guilt or sentence on the basis of the new evidence regarding guilt. This
proposal is designed to achieve the benefits of the jury's judgment and the
grand jury's historic role as a protector of liberty,38 while accommodating the
states' interest in avoiding frivolous delays. Because the issues in dispute will
be relatively narrow, focusing on the significance of the particular newly-available evidence, the new proceeding should be a streamlined one, combining
elements of grand jury practice with features of the summary jury trial com36. The states' incentive for becoming more hospitable to these claims would be the prospect of their earlier resolution. Proposal One can be adopted with or without the states' cooperation, and, in light of its minimal interference with state perogatives, and the obvious injustice
which is being attacked, it might be. As things now stand, Proposal One would inevitably
create delay. If, however, the prisoner had received a continuing opportunity to make the claim
in state court, then, on federal habeas corpus, it would be far more vulnerable to the normal
rules of exhaustion and procedural default. Moreover, if a state court granted a hearing, its
findings would be entitled to the usual presumption of correctness under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)
(1988). These advantages have not been lost on the states in the past and perhaps will not be in
the future.
In addition, the states' adoption of Proposal Two would lessen any tendency on the part of
federal judges to apply a more lenient standard to non-innocence claims where those claims
raised doubts as to guilt. One common example is an ineffective assistance of counsel challenge
based on a failure to uncover exculpatory evidence. As things now stand, the federal judge
cannot be sure whether the real attack is on counsel or on the verdict; to prevent injustice, she
may be tempted to give more weight to the former attack if the latter appears meritorious, even
though counsel could not reasonably have prevented the outcome on the facts that were then
available. If a corrective mechanism were in place on the state level, this problem would not
exist. An additional desirable consequence would probably be to render attacks on the performance of counsel fewer and better focused.
37. I adopt here the subjective bad faith standard of Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963),
simply because that standard is the only appropriate one to apply in a context where the error to
be avoided is the most serious injustice our system of laws can commit. See Catz, The Death
Penalty andFederalHabeas Corpus:A Modest Legislative Proposal,20 CONN. L. REV. 895, 91415 (1988).
38. A recent comprehensive study has highlighted the considerable practical importance of
this role in the context of the realities of the death penalty today. It calls for a reworking of
legal doctrine so as to allow the grand jury to resume "its historic protective functions in safeguarding the administration of modem systems of capital punishment." Acker, The Grand Jury
and CapitalPunishment: Rethinking the Role of an Ancient Insitution under the Modern Jurisprudence of Death, 21 PAC. L.J. 31, 118 (1989).
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monly employed as an alternative dispute resolution technique.3 9
The panel would determine whether a new trial were appropriate. A

judge who disagreed with its determination could grant a new panel hearing
on the same basis as a new trial in a civil action, Le., a discretionary determination that this course would be in the interests of justice. 4° If neither event
occurred, the defendant could only successfully appeal the ruling by meeting
41
the strict standards applicable to judgments notwithstanding the verdict.
CONCLUSION

Plainly, these proposals are not detailed legislation. Just as plainly, they
would entail some delay. But they would significantly ameliorate what all
agree to be a problem of serious concern. "If there must indeed be some tradeoff between speed and justice, we [sh]ould prefer a slower but fairer death

penalty system to its opposite."'4 2
Whatever the merits of these particular suggestions, they contain a
broader lesson: improvements in the death penalty system need not be divisive. Fairness is desirable whether one's ultimate goal is to abolish capital
punishment altogether43 or to make the system process more cases expedi39. For example, as in summary jury trials, voir dire should be compressed in recognition
of the panel's limited function. See Lambros, The Summary Jury Trial and Other Alternative
Methods ofDisputeResolution, 103 F.R.D. 461,483 (1984). Similarly, the new panel should not
re-hear the evidence previously considered. That evidence could be put before the jury as in
summary jury trials, through the presentations of counsel, or it could be done through an
agreed written statement. Or perhaps, as in the grand jury room, evidentiary rules could be
relaxed to permit one witness to summarize testimony that several would be needed to present
at an ordinary trial. The only feature critical to the structure of my proposal is that the panel
hear in full evidentiary form the newly-discovered exculpatory evidence, as well as any responsive proof offered by the government. After that, it might be appropriate for the panel to be
given the opportunity, as a grand jury is, to request the production of additional evidence.
Credit for inventing the summary jury trial is generally given to Judge Thomas D. Lambros of the Northern District of Ohio, who has described in a number of articles the procedures
he employs. See Lambros, The Summary Jury Trial - An Alternative Method of Resolving
Disputes, 69 JUDICATURE 286, 288-90 (1986); Lambros, The Summary Jury Trial and Other
Alternative Methods ofDispute Resolution, supra, at 470-71; Lambros & Shunk, The Summary
Jury Trial, 29 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 43, 46-51 (1980). Building in part on the summary jury
model, a very.suggestive student piece has argued that a number of areas of current legal sensitivity, including capital punishment, might benefit if judges made wider use of their broad discretionary powers to employ advisory juries. Note, Practiceand Potential of the Advisory Jury,
100 HARv. L. REv. 1363, 1373-74 (1987).
40. See, e.g., Ford v. Robinson, 403 So. 2d 1379, 1382 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) ("power
of the trial judge to order a new trial derives... from the equitable concept that neither a
wronged litigant nor society itself can afford to be without some means to remedy a palpable
miscarriage of justice").
41. See, e.g., Hendricks v. Dailey, 208 So. 2d 101, 103 (Fla. 1968) (judge may grant a
judgment notwithstanding the verdict "only if there is no evidence or reasonable inferences to
support the opposing position").
42. Legislative Modification, supra note 1, at 851.
43. Of course, it is theoretically possible that those who wish to abolish the system might
find it politically more valuable to sacrifice some innocent prisoners as martyrs to the cause than
to save them through improved procedures; but such a strategy would not be moral, practicable,
or promising.
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tiously. 4 Governors may become prisoners, and prisoners governors; any of
the citizens in whose name an execution is carried out today may be wrongly
accused of a crime tomorrow.4"
The incorporation of this sobering realization into our legal system is, as
a matter of practical politics, most likely to be achieved by basing reform proposals on bedrock principles - such as the central roles of federalism and the
jury in preserving liberty in this country - that transcend ideological
differences.
44. See, e.g., JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT AND PROPOSAL
OF THE AD Hoc CoMMITTEE ON FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS IN CAPITAL CASES 7 (1989)
("The fundamental requirement of a criminal justice system is fairness."); Toward a More Just
and Effective System of Review in State Death Penalty Cases, A.B.A. TASK FORCE ON DEATH
PENALTY HABEAS CORPUS 6 (1989).
45. Cf J. RAWLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 136-42 (1971) (fundamental to a just society is
its creation by parties behind "the veil of ignorance" so that principles are generated independent of personal station).
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